This paper characterizes the welfare efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium and provides bounds for the loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. I only assume that demand is decreasing in price and costs increasing in the quantity produced as long as Cournot equilibrium exists. I show how price, demand and average cost, before and after the number of firms in the market changes, can be used to compute these bounds. I apply these bounds to the Portuguese wireline market and conclude that the welfare loss carried by Portugal Telecom's monopoly in 2005 reduced significantly when the company was split in 2007.
Introduction
Research measuring the welfare inefficiency of oligopolies captured significant attention during many decades now. Most of this research was prompted by the early result in (Harberger 1954) , who found that the welfare loss associated with monopolies in US manufacturing could be surprisingly low. Other researchers using the same methodology found similar results in other sectors and countries. Among other concerns, these studies were criticized because they failed to measure costs well and assumed constant marginal costs. In more recent years, a number of theoretical studies determined bounds for the welfare loss associated with Cournot competition such as (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2005) and (Guo and Yang 2005) . Most of these studies assume increasing convex costs. However, firms in a number of economically relevant sectors, such as capital intensive industries, exhibit economies of scale, to which the prior literature does not apply. Also in recent years, a number of papers, such as (Anderson and Renault 2003) and (Corchon 2008) , looked at the effect of the curvature of demand on welfare loss but assuming again constant marginal costs. This paper develops bounds for welfare loss allowing both for flexible costs curves and for exploring the effect of the curvature of demand. I study how consumer surplus and welfare change under Cournot competition when the number of firms in the market changes. These bounds rely only on data observed around equilibrium such as price, average cost, demand served and the curvature of demand. Except for the curvature of demand these data are typically publicly available. Thus, these bounds can be widely applied in practice and one can use them to study how the curvature of demand affects consumer and welfare loss. The bounds provided in this paper highlight the following dynamics. Consider a demand function locally concave around the market configuration before the number of firms in the market changes. Firm entry decreases prices and moves equilibrium along a relatively inelastic portion of the demand curve. As a result, total output is unlikely to change much but consumers are likely to become better off. If, instead, demand is locally convex then firm entry still reduces price but moves the equilibrium along a relatively elastic portion of the demand curve. This results in a large increase in total output but most of the surplus gain will go to firms.
Bounds for the change in welfare loss associated with the movements de-scribed above can then be obtained by constraining the global degree of concavity and convexity of the demand function. Intuitively, such a constraint ensures that the curvature of demand at the market equilibrium after the number of firms in the market changes is relatively similar to the one at the market equilibrium before the change thus allowing us to use the arguments described in the previous paragraph. Bounding the curvature of demand can be accomplished resorting to the concept of ρ-concavity such as in (Anderson and Renault 2003) . However, in this paper, the authors assumed constant marginal costs and no fixed costs. These are unnecessary restrictions that I lift in this paper where I only needs equilibria to exist to study its welfare properties. In this regard, (Gaudet and Salant 1991) showed that with ρ-concave demand equilibrium exists and is unique as long as marginal costs decrease at rate lower than demand does. As such, my results allow for (not too) concave costs and thus may apply to capital intensive industries.
A main contribution of this paper is that my results allow both for exploring the effect of the curvature of demand on welfare as well as for costs to be concave. I allow average cost to change with production and show that bounds for the welfare loss can be computed using only observed information about the market around equilibrium. In the later part of this paper, I provide an empirical application to the telecommunications sector and show ways to bound the curvature of demand in a pragmatic setting. This exercise provides strong evidence that the split of ZON-Multimedia from Portugal Telecom in late 2007 increased consumer surplus and welfare in the Portuguese wireline market. Finally, I note that the bounds derived in this paper are not industry specific and can be applied to other industries in the same vein as I do here for the telecommunications sector.
Literature Review
Capital intensive industries are likely to exhibit economies of scale. In these industries there is typically room for only a few firms who benefit from decreasing average costs to drive competition away. Firms with sufficient capital for upfront investment that tap the market first are likely to enjoy an advantage. Natural oligopolies emerge and regulation is often used to preclude firms from abusing from market power. Otherwise, firms can raise equilibrium prices well above average cost hurting consumers. Unfortunately, most empirical studies looking at the welfare efficiency of oligopolies assume constant marginal costs. See, for example, (Harberger 1954) and follow-up studies such as ( (Schwartzman 1960) , (Worcester 1973) , (Siegfried and Tiemann 1974) , (Worcester 1975) , (Gisser 1982) , (Gisser 1986) , (Hefford and Round 1978) , (Jenny and Weber 1983) and (Dickson and Yu 1989) . This assumption precludes these studies from considering how costs change when increased competition expands output, which affects profits, and possibly demand, and thus changes welfare. (Stigler 1956 ), (Bergson 1973) , (Tullock 1967) and (Posner 1975 ) offer a number of additional in favor of abandoning constant marginal costs when measuring welfare loss in oligopolies.
A number of theoretical studies that look at welfare efficiency do not restrict marginal costs to be constant. However, all of them assume increasing convex costs and often require markets with similar firms. For example, (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2005) showed that if n similar firms with increasing convex costs compete a-la Cournot to meet affine decreasing demand then welfare loss is at most 1/(2n + 1). (Guo and Yang 2005) showed that with increasing convex costs, decreasing demand and concave revenues, the welfare inefficiency of the Cournot equilibrium is given by (1 + 2θγs 1 )/(1 + 2θ
where s i is the market share of the i th firm. Firms are ordered so that s 1 is the largest market share. Parameter γ is the maximum of γ(x) for x > 0 with γ(x) implicitly defined by p(x) + s 1 xp (x) = p(γ(x)x), where p represents the price function. θ is the maximum of θ(x) for x > 0 with
. The bounds provided in these papers for the welfare efficiency of a Cournot equilibrium are interesting because they do not require full knowledge of the cost functions. However, the first paper requires firms to be similar. The second paper relaxes this assumption and allows for a more general demand curve. Still, the expressions obtained, including implicitly defined functions, are hard to understand from an intuitive point of view and provide little economic insight.
Other papers impose more restrictive assumptions on the shape of the cost functions and instead explore the curvature of demand to study the welfare efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium. For example, (Anderson and Renault 2003) considered n similar firms with constant marginal cost and no fixed costs facing ρ-concave demand with ρ > −1. They showed that the Percentage Welfare Loss (PWL) of the Cournot equilibrium is given by 1−(1+(1/(n+ρ))(1+ρ/n) −1/ρ . (Corchon 2008) showed that PWL decreases in n, is quasi-concave in ρ and goes to 0 when ρ goes to either infinity or -1. He also computed bounds for the PWL and extended them to the case of firms with different constant marginal costs to show that assuming similar constant marginal costs underestimates PWL.
The current paper offers bounds for the welfare inefficiency of the Cournot equilibrium allowing both for a flexible definition of costs and for exploring the effect of the curvature of demand thus bringing together under more general results the advantages of the prior literature that only studied these issues separately. I also resort to the ρ-concavity of demand to study welfare efficiency. However, I do not require costs to be convex as long as Cournot equilibrium exists. More specifically, I use the result in (Gaudet and Salant 1991) who generalized the findings in (Novshek 1985) to show that if C i (q i ) < P (Q) and P (Q) + QP (Q) ≤ 0 then Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique. C i represents the cost function of firm i and q i represents the quantity produced at the Cournot equilibrium by this firm. P and Q represent the price function and the total quantity produced, respectively. Intuitively, the former condition ensures that profits are concave. The latter condition implies that reaction curves have negative slope.
Definitions and Assumptions
Consider n firms that offer a homogeneous product and compete a-la Cournot. Let p n represent the price they charge at equilibrium and letp ≤ +∞ represent a large enough price such that p n ≤p. Consider the following two assumptions, which I will assume true throughout the paper: A1) demand is given by D :
2 with D(p) > 0 for p ≤p and D(p) = 0 for p >p; A2) firm j has variable marginal cost c j :
c j (q)dq + F )/q represent the average cost faced by firm j.
A non-negative function f defined in a convex domain R is ρ-concave,
1/ρ for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and for all x, y ∈ R. The traditional definition of concavity is obtained for ρ = 1. This traditional definition, however, does not capture the fact that concave functions may have different degrees of curvature. Parameter ρ in the definition of ρ-concavity is introduced to do so. A function f is ρ-concavity (with ρ > 0) if the straight line connecting any two of its points lies below f ρ (for ρ < 0 it must lie below −f ρ ). This means that f ρ is concave (or convex when ρ < 0). Therefore, if function f is ρ-concave with
). This non-linear transformation of the vertical axis from f to f ρ allows for associating ρ with the degree of curvature of f . In words, correcting for ρ the function "loses" its concavity and becomes "only" concave. Furthermore, a function with a higher ρ is "more concave" and a ρ-concave function is also ρ -concave for ρ < ρ. ρ-convexity is defined by reversing the inequalities.
For any positive monotone function f defined in a convex domain there exist ρ 1 and ρ 2 in the extended real line such that f is ρ 1 -concave and ρ 2 -convex and and ρ 1 ≤ ρ 2 . See (Anderson and Renault 2003) for a detailed proof. Therefore, in my case, there exist ρ Figure 1 illustrates, this means, for example, that demand can be, at the same time, convex and ρ-concave, for some ρ < 1. This allows for bounding demand from below and above, which I will use extensively in this paper to establish my results. Figure  2 shows an example of these bounds in practice 1 . Finally, a function is ρ-linear if it is both ρ-concave and ρ-convex. Also, ρ-concavity is defined for ρ = −∞, 0, +∞ using continuity arguments. For example, f is 0-concave, or log-concave,
2 . Notably, ρ = −∞ is the weakest case of ρ-concavity, requiring only the function to be quasi-concave. In line with Anderson and Renault (2003) , all analyses in this paper as-
<<
The results in the paper do not explicitly consider the case ρ = 0 for sake of space. All results extend trivially to this case using the definition of log concavity.
. (Novshek 1985) showed how log-concavity of demand, that is P (D) + P (D)D < 0, yields existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium with increasing convex costs. Gaudet and Salant (1991) showed how this result can be extended to allow for concave costs as long as c j > P . Essentially, the first and second order conditions for Cournot equilibrium for firm j with n firms in the market are
respectively, where D n j represents the demand served by firm j and D n the total demand served. The second order conditions are satisfied with log concave demand and c j > P because both terms in brackets are negative (see (Vives, 1999) for a detailed proof). To accommodate −1 < ρ − d < 0 rewrite the second order conditions as
, which still allows for concave costs 4 .
Throughout the paper, and similarly to Anderson and Renault (2003) , I will assume that the first order conditions characterize the Cournot equilibrium. The first order condition for firm j is
where s n j = D n j /D n represents the share of the market served by firm j at equilibrium and D n is an abbreviation for D (p n ). Finally, note that in this setting I also have p n ≤ pñ forñ ≥ n. 
The profit of firm j is given by (P (Q) −c j (q j ))q j , where q j represents the quantity produced by firm j. Setting the derivative to zero yields (P ( 
Changes in Surplus and Welfare
The ρ − d -concavity and the ρ + d -convexity of demand can be used to compute bounds for the loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. Let CS n , P S n and W n represent the consumer surplus, producer surplus, and welfare at Cournot equilibrium with n firms in the market. Let n b ≥ n a and define
as the welfare loss, in percentage terms, when the number of firms in the market decreases from n b to n a . Similarly, define P CSL na,n b = (CS n b − CS na )/CS n b for the case of consumer surplus and define P P SL na,n b = (P S n b − P S na) /P S n b for the case of producer surplus. I start by stating a fundamental Lemma that will be used later in the paper. All proofs of all lemmas and results in this section are provided in Appendix 8.
This lemma uses the ρ 
where
Summing Expression 1 over all firms and substituting
Note that this expression is still valid when some firms decide not to produce at the Cournot equilibrium because such a firm enjoys no profit and its market share is zero. This expression shows that f n (ρ) can be computed using data observed at the equilibrium on the demand served, how demand changes locally, price and average cost. It is also easy to see that f n (ρ) > 0 for all ρ > −1.
Lemma 2 shows that f n (ρ) represents the ratio between producer surplus and consumer surplus at the Cournot equilibrium with n firms in the market and ρ-linear demand. Note that the definition of f n (ρ) includes P S n explicitly. The intuition behind the other factors in this definition is illustrated in Figure 3 . Demand lies below a ρ 
, which are the remaining factors in the definition of f n (ρ) 6 . Therefore, studying the behavior of f n (ρ) allows for understanding how welfare at equilibrium splits between consumers and producers, which can provide regulators with valuable insight about the fairness of the Cournot allocation.
<< Figure 3 about here >>
My first result pertains to consumer surplus loss at the Cournot equlibrium:
Note that g n,ñ (ρ) can be computed using data observed at the equilibrium on the demand served, how demand changes locally and price. Note also that the ρ-concavity of demand implies
Making y = pñ and x = p n shows that g n,ñ (ρ) > 0 for any ρ > −1.
Result 1 shows that g n,ñ (ρ) represents the ratio of consumer surplus at Cournot equilibrium withñ and n firms. The intuition behind the definition of g n,ñ (ρ) is illustrated in Figure 4 . Demand lies above a ρ + d -linear function that is tangent to it at price p n because demand is ρ Result 1 shows that studying the behavior of g n,ñ (ρ) allows for understanding the percentage loss in consumer surplus when the number of firms in the market changes. This is often the fundamental information sought by regulators to learn how changes in the number of firms in the market may affect consumers. The next result pertains to producer surplus loss at the Cournot equilibrium:
Finally, I can bound the welfare loss at the Cournot equilibrium when the number of firms in the market changes:
Result 3 shows how welfare can still increase when the number of firms in the market reduces from n b to n a . Let m
n represent the percent margin of firm j at equilibrium. Substituting Expression 1 into the definition of
n represents the sum of the revenues of the n firms in the market at the Cournot equilibrium. This expression is the weighted average of the percent margins of the firms in the market at the Cournot equilibrium, the weights being their market shares, scaled by the ratio of revenues to consumer surplus. Therefore, with ρ-linear demand,
. Intuitively, welfare increases if this scaled version of the weighed average of the percent margins increases enough with the change in the number of firms in the market to counter the loss in consumer surplus.
Consider now that one knows P P SL n b ,na . In this case, the following results hold:
Result 5 is particularly relevant for a policy maker because it defines an area within the (ρ
, in which one knows that welfare loss is at least α. Let β = (1 − α)/(1 − P P SL n b ,na ). Figure 5 shows the several cases that arise for the shape of this area, which depends on how β compares to 1 and to In the preceding results I have assumed that the demand curve does not change while the number of firms in the market does. This, however, may be a strong assumption. A number of factors, some potentially unknown to the researcher, may lead demand to change too. The fact that the number of firms in the market changes may, just by itself, affect the consumers' willingness to pay. However, Results 4 and 5 are powerful in this respect because they apply even when the demand curve changes. To see this note that the proofs of these results rely on bounding the ratio between consumer and producer surplus before and after the change in the number of firms in the market. Each of these bounds can be obtained using a different demand curve. For example, in the proof of Result 4, I use CS na /CS
, using Lemma 2, is obtained using the demand curve when there were n a firms in the market. Likewise, bounding [CS n b /P S n b ], using also Lemma 2, is obtained using the demand curve when there were n b firms in the market. Nothing in the proof of this result requires these two demand curves to be the same. Similar arguments apply to Result 5, which also holds when the demand curve changes.
Finally, and for sake of comparing the results obtained in this paper to those in prior literature, assume ρ-linear demand and constant average costs. In this case, I obtain:
(1 − P CSL n,n+1 (ρ)) and likewise for P W L n b ,na (ρ). Therefore, the change in consumer surplus and in welfare when one firm shuts down provides already very useful information. Figure  7 show P CSL n+1,n and P W L n+1,n for n = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and ρ ∈ [−1, 10]. Both P CSL n+1,n and P W L n+1,n decrease as the number of firms grows, for any ρ > −1. The effect of losing one firm on consumer surplus and welfare decreases as more firms are in the market. P W L n+1,n is quasi-concave in ρ and P CSL n+1,n is increasing and concave in ρ. I have lim ρ→−1 P W L n+1,n = lim ρ→∞ P W L n+1,n = lim n→∞ P W L n+1,n = 0. In this case of ρ-linear demand with constant average costs, the maximum welfare loss from losing one firm is roughly 20%, obtained with a monopolist and ρ ≈ −0.42. Note also that the welfare efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium found in (Anderson and Renault 2003) for the case of ρ-linear demand with similar constant marginal costs and no fixed costs is obtained by making n a = n in expression 2 and allowing n b → ∞. I also have lim ρ→−1 P CSL n+1,n = lim n→∞ P CSL n+1,n = 0 but now lim ρ→∞ P CSL n+1,n = 1/(1 + n). These results show that consumer surplus and welfare losses are small when the Cournot equilibrium is around an elastic portion of the demand curve. When the Cournot equilibrium is around an inelastic portion of the demand curve, welfare loss is also small but consumer surplus loss can be significant. The latter is inversely proportional to the number of firms in the market. Therefore, markets with inelastic demand and few firms render the most concern for regulatory agencies when, for example, mergers occur. Typical sectors under such circumstances with impact on everyone's daily life include telecommunications, electricity and gasoline.
Finally, Appendix 7 derives similar bounds for the loss in welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. These bounds can be computed using the same information used to compute the bounds for the loss in consumer surplus provided in this section.
<< Figure 7 about here >>
An Application
This section illustrates how the bounds obtained in this paper can be used in practice. I study a split that occurred in the Portuguese wireline market -namely in fixed broadband access -at the end of 2007 but other interesting examples in the scope of other capital intensive industries can be easily developed using the same approach. I use two main sources of data. The first dataset includes, for each firm separately, revenues and the number of Revenue Generating Units (RGUs) served per quarter. An RGU is a standard concept used in the scope of the telecommunications industry and corresponds to a pair (costumer, service subscribed). Operating revenues include payments obtained to provide voice and data services in retail and wholesale markets. The second dataset includes operating costs (opex) and capital expenditures (capex). For each firm separately, and on a quarterly basis, operating costs include wages and salaries, direct costs and commercial costs. Capex includes investments in infrastructure and maintenance costs. It is spread over the useful life of the assets purchased and capitalized on a quarterly basis.
Before delving into the empirical analysis note that using Cournot to describe competition in this market seems appropriate. As discussed in (Cabral 2000) Cournot and Bertrand models rely on similar assumptions but predict very different behavior. In industries where firms need to decide on both capacity and price the crucial aspect to choose between these two models is the relative timing of these decisions. If price is easier to adjust than capacity then the best model is one in which firms first decide on capacity and later choose prices. This is what typically happens in capital intensive industries such as telecommunications. The Cournot model is known to be the one that corresponds to this setup. As (Cabral 2000) discusses most real world industries are indeed closer to the case in which capacity is difficult to adjust. Yet, it is worth to note that in recent years digitization has been allowing some firms, such as software developers, to adjust capacity rather quickly, for example, by shipping electronic copies of their applications over the Internet.
In the beginning of 2005, PT dominated the Portuguese wireline market. The company's market share was roughly 90% according to ANACOM -the Portuguese Telecommunications regulator (Cardoso 2007 (Telecom 2010) . In the end of 2009, ZON and PT combined accounted for more than 85% market share in the wireline business in Portugal. At this point in time, PT's and ZON's average costs were not very different from each other because ZON's backbone infrastructure was not remarkably different from PT's. In fact, ZON and PT shared infrastructure for sometime after the split until they were technically able to separate their networks. Also, PT's and ZON's average prices were not very different from each other due to the fierce competition between them. Figure 9 depicts this market dynamics.
<< Figure 9 about here >> The bounds developed in this paper show how the split of PT-Multimedia from PT and the subsequent growth of ZON contributed to increase welfare in the Portuguese wireline market. The above mentioned data provide estimates for the price, average cost and demand served before and after the change in the number of firms in the market -
and Dñ, respectivly. Computing the bounds offered in this paper requires, in addition to these data, estimates for D n , D ñ and for the curvature of demand. The former two can be obtained by comparing the data between 1Q2005 and 2Q2005 and the data between 3Q2009 and 4Q2009. These comparisons provide local estimates for the slope of demand. In my case Obtaining estimates for the degree of the curvature of demand is accomplished by fitting a ρ-demand curve of the form (a − b) p to the data available. One can use any two, any three or the four data points available to do so. This exercise results in 10 different estimates for the degree of the curvature of demand in the Portuguese wireline market during my period of analysis. The lowest of these estimates is 1.473 and the highest is 1.612. These estimates provide reasonable values for ρ − d and ρ + d in face of the data available that one can use to bootstrap a sensitivity analysis. Substituting into Results 1 and 3 yields 51.3% >P CSL > 49.6% and 19.7% >P W L > 18.5%. Therefore, the data available provide strong evidence that the split of PT in the end of 2007 increased welfare and benefited consumers. The top panels in Figure 11 show how consumer surplus and welfare change when ρ 
Conclusions
This paper provides bounds for the loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. These bounds apply to capital intensive industries by allowing costs to be concave as long as Cournot equilibrium exists. This is a departure from the previous literature that required convex costs and, often, constant marginal costs and similar firms, to provide such bounds. In addition, this paper uses the concept of ρ-concavity to bound demand, which allows for exploring how its curvature affects these losses. Therefore, this paper combines under more general results analyses that the previous literature considered only separately.
The bounds developed in this paper rely on very little data observed at the Cournot equilibrium. Estimates for the demand served, the price charged and the average costs experienced by firms before and after the change in the number of firms in the market are enough to compute them. This information is typically publicly available and thus these bounds can be widely used in practice. They provide preliminary estimates for how consumers are affected when the number of firms in the market changes and thus provide starting values from which policy analysts can run sensitivity analyses to conclude how results may change with uncertainty about costs and about the curvature of demand.
As a special case, I look at how mergers affect these losses by studying how consumer surplus and welfare change when one firm shuts down. While welfare losses are not necessarily large when demand is both relatively elastic or relatively inelastic around the Cournot equilibrium, the loss in consumer surplus due to a merger can be significant in the latter case and, in particular, when only a few firms remain in the market. Hence, anti-trust authorities should keep monitoring industries with "very concave" demand and only a few firms, such as telecommunications, electricity and gasoline, to name a few examples with significant impact on everyone's daily life. I also present an empirical example showing how the bounds developed in this paper can be used in practice. Nonetheless, this paper does not come without limitations. First, the bounds developed in this paper provide preliminary estimates for losses. Yet, they apply in contexts where only little data are available and thus provide guidance when it is perhaps most needed. Second, it is hard to empirically separate the effect of the change in the number of firms from confounding effects that may affect demand concurrently. A number of results in this paper allow for comparing welfare at two moments in time with different number of firms and different demand curves but ultimately one needs additional assumptions to better isolate the effect of changing the number of firms in the market on welfare. Examples of concurrent changes that may take place include the rollout of new technologies and maintenance of existing ones. Finally, the bounds offered in this paper apply only in the case of a single product but, in practice, and in particular in modern telecommunication markets, companies launch several products at the same time, which renders the question of welfare efficiency significantly harder and potentially a subject for future research.
Appendix on the Efficiency of the Cournot Equilibrium
The ρ − d -concavity and the ρ + d -convexity of demand can also one used to compute bounds for the efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium with n firms. Define efficient allocation as one that maximizes welfare. Let w CS n , w P S n and w W n represent the consumer surplus, the producer surplus and the welfare, respectively, at the efficient allocation with n firms. Define w P W L n = ( w W n −W n )/ w W n as the percentage welfare loss carried by the Cournot equilibrium with n firms in the market. Similarly, define w P CSL n = ( w CS n − CS n )/ w CS n and w P P SL n = ( w P S n − P S n )/ w P S n for the cases of consumer and producer surplus, respectively. 
The first order conditions to maximize welfare yield
for all j = 1, ...n. This expression shows that at the efficient allocation profit is positive as long as average cost is increasing. Consider the following lemma:
The next Lemma relates consumer surplus and producer surplus at the efficient allocation. Let
Summing Expression 2 over all firms and substituting
and therefore it is easy to see that the sign of w f n (ρ) is the same as that of w P S n for ρ > −1. This expression also holds when some firms do not produce at the efficient allocation because such a firm enjoys zero profit and has zero market share.
Lemma 4:
The next result relates consumer surplus at the Cournot allocation and at the efficient allocation. Let
As before in the case of g n,ñ (ρ), I have w g n (ρ) > 0, for all ρ > −1. The next Result pertains to consumer surplus loss:
Lemma 4 shows that w f n (ρ) represents the ratio between the producer surplus and the consumer surplus at the efficient allocation with n firms and a ρ-linear demand. Studying the behavior of w f n is thus enough to understand how welfare splits between consumers and producers at the efficient allocation. This can provide valuable insight for policy making. In addition, Result 6 shows that w g n (ρ) measures the loss in consumer surplus, in percentage terms, carried by the Cournot equilibrium. Studying the behavior of w g n (ρ) is thus enough to learn about how changes in the number of firms in the market affect consumers. Again, this can also provide valuable insight for regulators. The next two results pertain to producer surplus and welfare loss:
Result 8 cannot be used when w P S n = 0. An example is when c j (q) < 0 for all q ≥ 0. In such a case the following result should be used instead:
Note that w P S n = 0 arises also when one is interested in learning about the welfare loss of the Cournot equilibrium relative to the market configuration that maximizes welfare and allows firms to exactly break even. In this case, the FOC in Expression 2 does not hold but the FOC in Expression 1 still does. This allows for using Result 9 because its proof relies only on bounding the ratio of consumer and producer surplus at the Cournot equilibrium and the ratio of consumer surplus at the Cournot equilibrium and at the allocation that maximizes welfare keeping the firms' profit non-negative and the latter relies only on the price at that such allocation.
Assume now ρ-linear demand and constant average cost. In this case, I obtain
which recovers the result obtained in (Anderson and Renault 2003) . Figure 8 shows w P CSL n and w P W L n for n = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and ρ ∈ [−1, 10]. As before for the cases of P CSL n+1,n and P W L n+1,n , both w P CSL n and w P W L n decrease as the number of firms grows, for any ρ > −1. That is, consumer surplus loss and welfare loss are greater the fewer firms in the market.
w P W L n is quasi-concave in ρ and w P CSL n is increasing in ρ. I have lim ρ→−1 w P W L n = lim ρ→∞ w P W L n = lim n→∞ w P W L n = 0. In this case of ρ-linear demand and constant average costs, the maximum welfare loss of the Cournot equilibrium is roughly 26.4% obtained with a monopolist and ρ ≈ 0. I also have lim ρ→−1 w P CSL n = lim n→∞ w P CSL n = 0 but now lim ρ→∞ w P CSL n = 1 for any n ≥ 1. As before for the cases of P CSL n+1,n and P W L n+1,n , consumer surplus loss and welfare loss are small when the Cournot equilibrium is around an elastic portion of the demand curve. However, severe consumer surplus loss may arise when the Cournot equilibrium is around an inelastic portion of the demand curve irrespectively of the number of firms in the market. Once again, markets with inelastic demand render the most concern for regulatory agencies when mergers are to be considered.
<< Figure 8 about here >>
Appendix with Proofs
This appendix includes proofs of all Lemmas and Results included in sections 4 and 7 as well as the analysis of the behavior of P CSL n+1,n , P W L n+1,n , w P CSL n and w P W L n .
Lemma 1: n /CS n = f n (ρ) when demand in ρ-linear. 
This proof is based in the seminal result provided in (Anderson and Renault 2003) . Result 2: P P SL
. Use Lemma 2 twice, with n = n a and n = n b , to bound P S na /CS na and CS n b /P S n b , respectively. Use Result 1 to bound CS na /CS n b . The reverse inequality can be obtained swapping ρ
. Use Lemma 2 twice, with n = n a and n = n b , to bound P S na /CS na and P S n b /CS n b , respectively. Use Result 1 to bound CS na /CS n b . The reverse inequality can be obtained swapping ρ
. Use Lemma 2 twice, with n = n a and n = n b , to bound CS na /P S na and CS n b /P S n b , respectively. Substitute P S na /P S n b by 1 − P P SL n b ,na and the Result follows. A similar result, with the inequality reversed, can be obtained swapping ρ
. Use Lemma 2 twice, with n = n a and n = n b , to bound CS na /P S na and CS n b /P S n b , respectively. Substitute P S na /P S n b by 1 − P P SL n b ,na and the Result follows. A similar result, with the inequality reversed, can be obtained swapping ρ Lemma 3: Lemma 4:
Proof: make y = w p n in Lemma 3 and use the definition of
Similar results can be easily obtained by reversing the inequality when w P S n < 0. The reverse inequality can be obtained substituting ρ
Result 6: 
with y 1 ≥ p n and y 2 ≥ w p n . The result comes from making y 1 = y 2 = p n (note that w p n ≤ p n ) and using the definition of w g n (ρ w P CSL n = 1 − w g n (ρ) when demand is ρ-linear.
Result 7:
w P P SL
. Use Lemma 2, Result 6 and Lemma 4 to bound the terms in the first, second and third brackets, respectively, and the result follows. Similar results can be easily obtained by reversing the inequality when w P S n < 0. Similar ar-guments can be used to show that a lower bound holds swapping ρ
and thus
when demand is ρ-linear.
. Use Lemma 2, Result 6 and Lemma 4 to bound the first, second and third terms in brackets, respectively, and the result follows. The reverse inequality can be obtained swapping ρ
w g n (ρ) when demand is ρ-linear.
Proof: In this case,
Use Result 6 and Lemma Lemma 2 to bound the first and second terms in brackets, respectively, and the result follows. Similar arguments allow to show a lower bound swapping ρ
These properties are derived assuming ρ-linear demand and constant average cost atc. Note that in this case the Lerner rule yields nD n /D n = (c − p n ) −1 . Also, the FOC for welfare maximization,
Computing w P CSL n : Substituting w p n =c into the definition of w g n and using the Lerner rule readily provides w g n (ρ) = (1 + ρ/n) −(1+1ρ) .Therefore,
Computing P CSL n b ,na : Note that in this case w P S n = 0. Therefore,
and thus w W n does not depend on n.
Substituting the expressions for w P CSL na and w P CSL
Computing P W L n b ,na : Using the same approach as above
Properties of w P CSL n :
With S(ρ) = −ρ(1 + ρ) + (n + ρ)log(1 + ρ/n).
Consider n ≥ 2. Then:
Then S (ρ) = −2ρ + log(1 + ρ/n).
S (ρ) = −2 + 1/(n + ρ), which is always negative for ρ > −1. Therefore: S (ρ) is positive, then zero and then negative. The maximum of S(ρ) is obtained when n = ρ/(e 2ρ −1). This maximum is −ρ(1+ρ)+2ρ 2 /(1−e −2ρ ). This maximum is negative, then zero when ρ = 0 and positive thereafter. Coincidently, S(0) = 0 and therefore, S(ρ) < 0 for all ρ > −1. Hence,
> 0 for all ρ > −1 and w P CSL n (ρ) is increasing in ρ. Figure 8 illustrates these arguments. For n = 1,
The analysis for P CSL n+1,n is similar and available upon request.
Properties of
n(n+ρ) 2 (1 + ρ/n) −1/ρ < 0. w P W L n is decreasing in n.
∂ w P W L n ∂ρ = − −(1+ρ/n) −1/ρ ρ 2 (n+ρ) 2 S(ρ).
Let S(ρ) = −ρ(1 + n + 2ρ) + (n(n + 1) + ρ(ρ + 1) + 2nρ)log(1 + ρ/n).
∂ w P W L n ∂ρ = −(1 + nlog(1 − 1/n))/n > 0.
lim ρ→∞ ∂ w P W L n ∂ρ = 0.
lim ρ→−1 S(ρ) = (n − 1)(1 + nlog(1 − 1/n)) < 0.
lim ρ→∞ S(ρ) = +∞.
Then S (ρ) = −3ρ + (1 + 2n + 2ρ)log(1 + ρ/n).
lim ρ→−1 S (ρ) = 3 + (2n − 1)log(1 − 1/n) > 0.
lim ρ→∞ S (ρ) = +∞.
Then S (ρ) = 1/(n + ρ) − 1 + 2log(1 + ρ/n).
lim ρ→−1 S (ρ) = (2 − n + 2(n − 1)log(1 − 1/n))/(n − 1) < 0.
Then S (ρ) = (2(n + ρ) − 1)/(n + ρ) 0 , which is always positive for ρ > −1. Therefore: S (ρ) is negative, then zero then positive. The minimum of S (ρ) is obtained when 2log(1 + ρ/n) = 1 − 1/(n + ρ). This minimum is always negative (because, for example, S (1) = −3 + (3 + 2n)log(1 − 1/n) < 0.Consequently, S(ρ) increases, then decreases and then increases again. The maximum of S(ρ) is obtained when ρ = 0 and is also zero. It is readily shown that this minimum is always negative. Therefore, S(ρ) is negative, then zero, then negative and zero again and finally positive. Hence,
is first positive and then negative. Consequently, w P W L n (ρ) is quasi-concave in ρ. Figure 8 illustrates these arguments. For n = 1, ∂ w P W L n ∂n = −(1 + ρ) −(1+1/ρ) /ρ 2 ((2 + ρ)log(1 + ρ) − 2ρ)). The last bracket is negative and then positive. Therefore, again, w P W L n (ρ) is quasi-concave in ρ. The analysis for P W L n+1,n is similar and available upon request.
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